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Abstract Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and many
other countries have adopted a ‘‘paradigm of prevention,’’ employing a range of measures
in an attempt to prevent future terrorist attacks. This includes the use of pretextual charges
for preventive detention, the expansion of criminal liability to prohibit conduct that pre-
cedes terrorism, and expansion of surveillance at home and abroad. Politicians and gov-
ernment officials often speak of prevention as if it is an unqualified good. Everyone wants
to prevent the next terrorist attack, after all. And many preventive initiatives, especially
where they are not coercive and do not intrude on liberty, are welcome. But the move to a
‘‘preventive justice’’ model also creates potential for significant abuse. These risks suggest
that we should be cautious about adopting preventive approaches, especially where they
involve coercion. In part I of this essay, I articulate why preventive coercion is a problem. I
respond, in particular, to a recent essay by Fred Schauer, ‘‘The Ubiquity of Prevention,’’
which argued that ‘‘it is a mistake to assume that preventive justice is a problem in itself
[because] preventive justice is all around us, and it is hard to imagine a functioning society
that could avoid it.’’ In part II, I outline the formal constitutional and other constraints that
are implicated by preventive measures in the United States, and I demonstrate that these
constraints play a relatively small role in the actual operation of preventive measures. In
part III, I maintain that informal constraints may actually play a more significant opera-
tional role in checking the abuses of prevention.
Keywords Preventive justice  Terrorism  Material support  Preventive
detention
Everything did not change on September 11, 2001, but one thing that did, in the United
States and elsewhere, was the intensity of the demand to prevent another terrorist attack.
By making thinkable what previously seemed unthinkable, the 9/11 attacks unleashed an
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urgent demand for ‘‘prevention.’’ One need not insist on preventing the unthinkable, after
all; the very fact that it is unthinkable means we need not waste resources trying to stop it.
By making such attacks—and worse—much more vivid, real, and immediately threaten-
ing, the 9/11 attacks sparked an unprecedented demand for prevention. In the U.S. and
elsewhere, government officials charged with keeping their citizens safe responded by
prioritizing prevention. As then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced shortly after
the attacks, the United States had entered a ‘‘paradigm of prevention.’’1 The paradigm has
not shifted since.
In the United States, the paradigm of prevention has had manifold consequences. It has
spurred Congress to define crimes of terrorism increasingly expansively, to make it easier
to prosecute and convict individuals before they succeed in committing an actual terrorist
act. It has led law enforcement officials to charge thousands of loosely defined ‘‘suspects’’
with pretextual offenses, both criminal and immigration-based, in the hope that by doing so
some undetected terrorist plot might be averted. It has prompted the aggressive deployment
of informants and agents provocateurs in Muslim communities across the country, in an
attempt to flush out potential terrorists and incapacitate them before they can act on their
nascent tendencies.2
The preventive paradigm has also had substantial repercussions outside the criminal and
immigration law. As Edward Snowden’s revelations about the National Security Agency
(NSA) have underscored,3 the government has vastly expanded surveillance, at home and
abroad, often without meeting the traditional threshold of probable cause that an individual
has or is engaged in criminal activity. The preventive paradigm has caused the United
Nations Security Council, the United States, and many other nations to impose onerous
restrictions on the economic activity of persons and groups labeled as ‘‘terrorist’’ in secret,
ex parte government proceedings. It has led the United States to go to war, first in
Afghanistan and then in Iraq; to rely on preventive detention and targeted killings; and to
expand in unprecedented ways (and ex post facto) the definition of ‘‘war crimes’’ in hopes
of holding Al Qaeda suspects criminally responsible in military commissions for acts that
were not war crimes when committed.4 And perhaps most infamously, the demand for
prevention led to the use of cruel and inhumane interrogation tactics against suspected
terrorists, up to and including torture, as well as rendition of suspects to other countries so
that they could torture them for us.
These are dramatic changes, most immediately felt in Muslim communities, but with
ripple effects that extend beyond these targets. The desire for prevention is not limited to
terrorism, of course. It is only most strongly felt there. Keeping the citizenry safe by
preventing crime is always a governmental priority. New York City’s aggressive stop-and-
frisk practices, for example, are a preventive measure designed to deter gun violence and
other crime on city streets.
1 Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft to the Council on Foreign Affairs, Feb. 10, 2003,
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm.
2 Stephan Salisbury, Mohamed’s Ghosts: A Story of Love and Fear in the Homeland (2010); Diala Shamas,
Nermeen Arastu, Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and Its Impact on American Muslims (2013), available
at http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA files—timeline, The Guardian (UK), July 25,
2013.
4 See, e.g., Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reversing war crime conviction for
‘‘material support’’ of terrorism on the ground that ‘‘material support’’ was not a war crime recognized by
international law at the time of charged conduct of alleged driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden).
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Prevention can take many forms. Some preventive measures raise few if any consti-
tutional or ethical concerns. Target-hardening of cockpit doors, for example, is a pre-
ventive measure, as are better lighting of urban alleys or more adult-supervised after-
school programs for youth. The preventive measures that raise concern, however, are those
that bring the coercive force of the law to bear on individuals and groups. It is this
preventive coercion that will be the focus of this essay.
In part I, I articulate why preventive coercion is a problem. This part responds, in
particular, to a recent essay by Fred Schauer, ‘‘The Ubiquity of Prevention,’’ which argued
that ‘‘it is a mistake to assume that preventive justice is a problem in itself [because]
preventive justice is all around us, and it is hard to imagine a functioning society that could
avoid it.’’5 In part II, I outline the formal constitutional and statutory constraints that are
implicated by preventive measures in the United States, but I also demonstrate that these
constraints play a relatively small role in the actual operation of preventive measures. In
part III, I maintain that for a variety of reasons, informal constraints may play a more
significant operational role in checking the abuses of prevention.
I. The Difference Prevention Makes
In ‘‘The Ubiquity of Prevention,’’ Fred Schauer argues that ‘‘preventive justice’’ does not
pose distinct normative concerns, because prevention is everpresent in the criminal justice
system. Schauer is correct that prevention as a motive and justification has long been
ubiquitous in criminal law and its enforcement, so that there is more continuity between
pre- and post-9/11 approaches than is sometimes acknowledged. One of the aims of
criminal law enforcement has always been the prevention of crime. When we impose a
sentence of incarceration, we incapacitate the defendant, and hope to deter others—both
preventive ends. But Schauer is wrong, I believe, to maintain that prevention does not raise
particular problems. The preventive use of coercion raises distinct normative concerns
from punitive uses of coercion—even if some or even most punitive measures also have
preventive goals. Because of the ubiquity of prevention in post-9/11 security policy, it is
important to identify those distinct concerns carefully.
The difference that prevention makes can be seen first-hand in the United States, where
the post-9/11 full-scale adoption of a paradigm of prevention amounted to a sea change in
law enforcement. In particular, the United States has dramatically increased its use of
targeted coercive sanctions against individuals, not primarily for what they have done in
the past, but for what it fears they might do in the future. It is one thing to note that
ordinary enforcement of criminal sanctions against past acts has deterrent and incapaci-
tative effects that serve preventive purposes. It is another matter entirely, however, to
impose targeted sanctions on individuals not for their past acts, but to prevent them from
engaging in future bad acts.
Schauer resists the difference, noting that traditional penalties based on past acts, like
sanctions predicated on future dangers, depend on proof that is ultimately probabilistic, and
therefore inescapably involves some risk of error. We can rarely know with 100 percent
certainty that a defendant committed the past act with which he is criminally charged,
Schauer argues, and a conviction does not require such perfect certainty, but only proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, he argues, convictions for past crime, like coercion
5 Fred Schauer, ‘‘The Ubiquity of Prevention,’’ in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner, & Patrick Tomlin, eds.,
Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 10–22.
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imposed for preventive ends, inevitably involve some risk of error. This much is true. But
Schauer’s effort to collapse the distinction between future-oriented prevention and past-
directed punishment ultimately fails. The concerns and risks raised by the targeted
imposition of coercive sanctions on individuals for preventive ends are different, in sub-
stantial degree, and sometimes in kind, from those raised by criminalizing and punishing
past acts, for five reasons.
First, and most importantly, however difficult it may be under some circumstances to
determine who did what in the past, it is not just difficult, but impossible, to predict with
anything like an equivalent degree of certainty what an individual will do in the future, at
least where free will is involved. (We can predict with confidence, for example, that a
given person will breathe in the future, but we generally cannot predict with such confi-
dence that he will choose to go to a particular restaurant, or commit a particular crime.)
The impossibility of predicting the future means that when we impose sanctions based on
future concerns rather than past acts, we inevitably must accept a lower standard of proof,
and far greater risk of error, than when we impose sanctions for past acts. Criminal
sanctions for past acts require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. If preventive sanctions
could be imposed only when we know beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual will
commit an illegal act in the future, such sanctions would almost never be imposed. Yet
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is precisely what we require—and what prosecutors
routinely satisfy—in traditional criminal trials. While proof of past acts and future acts are
both probabilistic, there are inherent limits on our ability to know the future that make
prediction of future conduct much more fraught than assessment of past conduct. Thus,
while it might be possible to insist on 90 or 95 percent certainty of past conduct for a
conviction, it is simply not possible to insist on the same degree of certainty with respect to
the future. Once we cross the threshold of imposing penalties and sanctions for what
someone might do in the future, we must necessarily also reduce the degree of certainty we
demand—and therefore, increase the risk of error.
Second, punishing an individual for past acts voluntarily or intentionally undertaken
does not disrespect her autonomy and free will. The criminal law acknowledges that people
have choices to make, and holds them responsible when they make choices that the
community has determined are socially disruptive. Holding an individual responsible for
her choices, as long as they are choices, respects her autonomy and free will. Indeed, if we
did not believe that a defendant had free will, it would not be fair to punish her. For this
reason, it is not permissible to make the status of being addicted to drugs a crime.6 Thus,
the traditional criminal sanction affirms free will. Punishing or otherwise restricting an
individual’s liberty based on a prediction that she might do something bad in the future, by
contrast, disrespects her free will, by dismissing or disregarding her ability to choose to
conform her actions to society’s norms.
Third, when the state imposes sanctions for what an individual might do in the future,
rather than for what she did in the past, the dangers of selective prosecution based on
impermissible criteria of race, ethnicity, or sex, are especially pronounced. While selective
enforcement is of course a potential problem in the investigation and prosecution of past
crimes, the problem is likely to be exacerbated when the state engages in predictive
policing. Virtually by necessity, predicting what an individual might do in the future
necessitates judgments based on generalizations about the kind of person he is. There is a
real risk that in making such judgments we will rely on group-based generalizations that
violate principles of equal treatment. Seeking to prevent espionage and sabotage, President
6 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt ordered the internment of all persons of Japanese descent on the
West Coast during World War II. Similarly, police in New York City stopped and frisked
black and Hispanic young men more frequently than whites, presumably based on their
assumption that such men were more likely to be carrying guns or drugs, or otherwise to
pose a risk of future criminal activity.7 In assessing responsibility for past actions, there is
an especially strong norm that people must be judged by their acts, not their status; but
when one turns to prediction, and the acts have yet to take place, generalizations are
virtually inescapable. And as history has shown, race, ethnicity and sex-based stereotypes
often have a strong pull on our expectations and judgments about people.
The second and third concerns identified above are mutually reinforcing. The centrality
of autonomy to notions of human agency makes its denial easier with respect to those
viewed as ‘‘other,’’ or different from ourselves. At the same time, the denial of autonomy is
particularly pernicious when focused on members of groups already more likely to be
viewed as ‘‘other.’’ The denial of autonomy eases the discrimination, and the discrimi-
nation in turn makes it easier to deny or disregard the autonomy of those we see as
different from us.
Fourth, a focus on preventing future harms affords no natural check on enforcement
measures. If we criminalize murder, and there are no murders, there are unlikely to be any
prosecutions for murder. If we adopt measures designed to prevent murders in the future,
we never can know whether our initiatives have in fact prevented murders that would have
happened, or whether the murders would not have occurred even if we had done nothing.
There have been virtually no terrorist attacks in the United States in the twelve years since
9/11, but is that because of, or in spite of, our preventive measures? Could we have
achieved the same result with less aggressive preventive measures? We do not, and
probably can never know. In the face of this uncertainty, ‘‘better safe than sorry’’ leads
almost inevitably to overinvestment in prevention in times of fear. We are currently
spending approximately $80 billion on counterterrorism initiatives—not counting Iraq and
Afghanistan expenditures—to stop an estimated 4,000 persons thought to be members of
Al Qaeda and associated forces from launching terrorist attacks against us. That’s $20
million per suspected terrorist per year.8
The requirement that sanctions must be predicated on for past acts is not always a check
on overzealous enforcement, particularly where the criminal conduct is widespread, as the
war on drugs in the United States has demonstrated. But with more serious and less
frequent crimes, one can generally prosecute only acts that have occurred. No such limit
applies to prevention, as one can never know what acts have—or have not—been pre-
vented. Thus, no objective measure exists by which one can reliably know how much is too
little, too much, or just enough prevention. When fear is pervasive, this uncertainty breeds
overenforcement.
Fifth, and finally, it is not just that we cannot know the efficacy of prevention; our
assessments are likely to be systematically skewed. The nature of prevention is such that
there is an inevitable imbalance between false negatives—where we wrongly conclude that
an individual poses no terrorist threat, and he goes on to commit a terrorist threat—and
false positives—where we wrongly conclude that an individual poses a terrorist threat but
7 Floyd v. City of New York, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113271 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2013).
8 Dan Raviv, Funding for fighting Al Qaeda could be cut, ex-spy chief says, CBS News, Oct. 28, 2011,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20126972-503544/funding-for-fighting-al-qaeda-
could-be-cut-ex-spy-chief-says/; David Cole, After September 11: What We Still Don’t Know, N.Y. Rev. of
Books, Sept. 29, 2011.
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he is in fact innocuous. If we err on the side of assuming an individual does not warrant
preventive measures, and he commits a terrorist act, the error is vivid and visible—think of
Willie Horton. If, by contrast, we err on the side of caution and unnecessarily impose
preventive measures on an individual who would have done no harm had we left him
alone, the ‘‘false positive’’ error is invisible, and ultimately unknowable. Anyone con-
fronting such an imbalance is likely to err on the side of caution, thus leading to a high
incidence of false positives. This dynamic produces overly aggressive enforcement (see
New York’s stop-and-frisk campaign), overly aggressive detention and pretextual prose-
cution (see the detention of over 5,000 foreign nationals, nearly all Muslim, in the U.S. in
the first two years after 9/11, none of whom turned out to be convicted of terrorism), and
overly aggressive inducements to commit terrorist acts by informants and provocateurs.9
For these reasons, preventive coercion raises concerns that are distinct from the con-
cerns posed by holding people accountable for past wrongs. These concerns in turn
implicate important constitutional and nonconstitutional legal principles. In the following
section, I will describe those principles and their application to preventive coercion.
II. The Limits of Law
Notwithstanding all of the above bases for concern, the Constitution does not prohibit
prevention as a tactic or a motive, and for good reason. We want our government to prevent
crime, and as noted above, there are many situations in which prevention infringes few or
no rights. Preventive coercion raises more substantial concerns, but is also sometimes
justified, as in a quarantine to halt the spread of a deadly communicable disease, a pro-
tective order designed to forestall domestic abuse, or the detention pending trial of a
defendant who poses a risk of flight or danger to others. Incarceration as punishment for the
commission of serious criminal offenses is often motivated in part by preventive concerns
and has preventive effects. Thus, there is no absolute prohibition on prevention, nor should
there be.
In theory, the paradigm of prevention is constrained by a number of constitutional
principles under U.S. law, including substantive and procedural due process, freedoms of
speech and association, equal protection, and the civil-criminal divide. In practice, how-
ever, formal constitutional constraints have played a relatively modest role in restricting
preventive measures. In part because prevention is as ubiquitous as Schauer notes, and
virtually impossible to disentangle cleanly from other criminal justice goals, constitutional
doctrine has developed few bright lines. But that is not to say that there are no limits. On
occasion, courts have ruled certain preventive measures unconstitutional. Perhaps because
the limits are well accepted, most of the controversy today in preventive coercion takes
place within the boundaries marked out by constitutional rules, and is the subject of less
formal, more political constraints.
A. The Principal Legal Constraints on Prevention
There are multiple legal constraints on prevention under U.S. law. First, the First and Fifth
Amendments restrict the state’s ability to target speech and association. Governments have
often used speech and association as proxies for who might engage in future dangerous
conduct, and penalized speech or association as a way of preempting that conduct. In the
9 See Trevor Aaronson, The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism, (2013).
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anti-Communist era, for example, federal law made both advocacy of Communist doctrine
and membership in the Communist Party crimes. After initially tolerating such laws, the
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that membership may not be prohibited absent proof that
an individual specifically intends to further the party’s illegal ends,10 and that advocacy of
violent overthrow of the government (or of any other criminal activity) may not be pun-
ished unless the speech is both intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action.11
These rules, which remain good law to this day, reflect lessons learned from the McCarthy
era, in which thousands of innocent citizens were caught up in the preventive frenzy of
anti-communism.12
Second, the due process clause imposes both substantive and procedural limits on the
use of detention as a preventive measure. The most important substantive limit is that
preventive detention can be employed only when the criminal justice system is inadequate
to address socially dangerous conduct.13 The Supreme Court has ruled that the state may
not subject individuals to indefinite preventive detention on the basis of future danger-
ousness alone.14 We presume that people will conform their actions to criminal laws, and
generally subject them to detention only upon proving that they failed to do so in the past,
not based on predictions that they will fail to do so in the future. Civil commitment, an
exception to this rule, is permissible only where an individual is found both to be dan-
gerous and to have a mental disability that undermines his ability to control himself.15 This
approach reflects a presumption that criminal sentences for past acts are the appropriate
route for addressing and preventing dangerous conduct. The requirement of a mental
disability that undermines the individual’s ability to conform his actions to the criminal law
permits civil commitment as a general matter only where we are unlikely to be able to hold
him criminally culpable, because he cannot control his actions.16
In the bail setting, the Supreme Court has permitted limited preventive detention
pending trial of persons who pose a future danger but are not mentally ill. But here, too, the
result is consistent with the notion that preventive detention is permissible only where
enforcement of the criminal law against past acts cannot adequately address the danger
presented. In United States v. Salerno,17 the Court upheld the Bail Reform Act, which
permits denial of bail to defendants charged with particularly serious crimes, where the
state shows that they would pose a risk of danger to the community if freed on bail, and
that there are no less restrictive means available to protect the community. In upholding
this use of preventive detention, the Court stressed that it applied only to those charged
with serious crimes, that the length of detention was limited by the requirement of a speedy
10 U.S. v. Scales, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
11 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
12 See, e.g., Geoffrey Stone, Perilous Times. Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the
War on Terrorism 311–426 (2004).
13 David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 Cal. L. Rev.
693 (2009).
14 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
15 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Eric S. Janus and
Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators,
35 Conn. L. Rev. 319 (2003).
16 Stephen Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction,
with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 69 (1996); Cole,
Out of the Shadows supra note 13.
17 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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trial, and that the state was required in each case to show that no less restrictive measures
would suffice to protect the community. Here, too, preventive detention fills a gap in
criminal justice. We cannot immediately incarcerate individuals for criminal activity, as
trials take time to prepare and conduct. Accordingly, where necessary to protect the
community, it is permissible to detain certain criminal defendants pending trial. (The same
principle applies to the detention of immigrants pending deportation who pose a risk of
flight or danger to the community).
A similar due process principle governs quarantines to stem the spread of dangerous and
highly communicable diseases. This practice is entirely preventive in character. Quaran-
tines are permissible because the danger of disease transmission cannot be addressed
through the criminal justice approach of holding people responsible for culpable behavior.
One cannot be held criminally responsible for being sick. Accordingly, the quarantine
responds to a social danger where the criminal justice system cannot.
The same substantive due process principle helps to explain preventive detention during
wartime.18 In a war, those fighting generally have the ‘‘privilege of belligerency’’ as long
as they abide by minimal rules of conduct. This privilege means that the state cannot
criminally punish those fighting against it for murder and assault, which would of course
otherwise be prosecutable crimes. Because such conduct cannot be addressed through
criminal law, preventive detention is permitted for the course of the conflict—but no
longer. Once the conflict ends, the privilege of belligerency is lifted, and the state can—and
must—revert to criminal law enforcement if it seeks to detain those who allegedly pose a
danger to the community.
Procedural due process also imposes checks on preventive coercion. If the state seeks to
take an individual’s liberty or property, it must generally ensure that he has notice of the
basis for its action and a meaningful opportunity to defend himself. This principle has been
held to apply to the preventive freezing of property of alleged terrorists and supporters of
terrorism19; the preventive detention of U.S. citizens allegedly fighting for the enemy
during wartime20; and the civil forfeiture of property used for criminal purposes.21
Third, a significant limit on prevention is reflected in the rule that the government may
not impose punishment without the procedural safeguards associated with criminal trials,
as set forth in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.22 To determine whether a preventive
measure is punitive, the Court employs a multi-factor test that examines: whether it
imposes a disability; whether that kind of disability has historically been viewed as pun-
ishment; whether it requires a finding of scienter; whether its imposition serves the tra-
ditional aims of punishment; whether the behavior that triggers it is already a crime;
whether an alternative purpose exists; and whether it is excessive in relation to the
18 See Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 13 at 706–718.
19 Al Haramain Islamic Found, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2012);
KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., Inc. v. Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2010). I
was counsel for plaintiffs in both of these cases.
20 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
21 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993).
22 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–166 (1963) (holding that stripping draft evaders of
citizenship was punishment that could not be imposed without the safeguards of a criminal trial); see also,
Eric Sandberg-Zakian, Counterrorism, the Constitution, and the Civil-Criminal Divide: Evaluating the
Designation of U.S. Persons under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 48 Harv. J. on Legis.
95 (2011).
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alternative purpose.23 If a sanction is deemed punitive, it may not be imposed without all
the constitutional safeguards that accompany criminal prosecution (including the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a clearly defined crime).
Fourth, preventive measures may implicate equal protection concerns. As noted above,
preventive predictions are often predicated on group characteristics. Where predictions are
based on characteristics that trigger skeptical treatment under the Constitution, such as
race, sex, or ethnicity, the Equal Protection Clause may prohibit the state’s action. Thus, an
official decision to stop and search black and Hispanic drivers more often than white
drivers, on the prediction that black and Hispanic drivers are more likely to be transporting
drugs, is likely to violate the Equal Protection Clause. To establish an equal protection
violation, one must prove that the state acted because of race, ethnicity or sex, and that it
treated similarly situated others differently, both of which can be difficult to prove.24
Nonetheless, the principle that the state may not rely on race-, sex-, or ethnicity-based
generalizations imposes some check on preventive measures.
Fifth, and finally, the entrapment doctrine provides both a constitutional and a non-
constitutional limit on preventive measures. One technique for preempting and preventing
crimes is the ‘‘sting’’ operation, in which informants or undercover agents identify indi-
viduals who they suspect may be inclined to commit crimes, and then tempt them into
committing a crime with various forms of encouragement and assistance. Since 9/11, the
United States has successfully prosecuted many individuals for attempted terrorist crimes
in this way.25 The entrapment doctrine provides a theoretical limit on such tactics. If the
state is unable to show that an individual who responded to an enticement to commit a
crime was ‘‘predisposed’’ to commit that crime, the defense of entrapment will bar con-
viction.26 In addition, if the government seeks to encourage criminal conduct through
measures that are ‘‘shocking to the universal sense of justice,’’ the due process clause may
preclude conviction.27 The idea is that there must be some point beyond which the state
may not ‘‘stress-test’’ its citizens by tempting them to commit crimes they would not
otherwise have committed.
All of these principles limit the state’s preventive choices in important ways. It cannot
criminalize pure speech or membership absent proof of a close nexus to illegal conduct. It
cannot lock up citizens for preventive purposes except where the presumptive route of
criminal law enforcement is unavailable. It cannot impose punitive sanctions without the
full safeguards of the criminal process. Even if sanctions are deemed nonpunitive, if they
restrict liberty or property, they must be accompanied by due process. The state may not
single out targets for prevention based on generalizations about their race, sex, or ethnicity.
And if the state entraps people who are not predisposed to commit a crime, prosecution
will be barred. These doctrines limit the coercive tactics the state can adopt for preventive
purposes, and thereby mitigate some of the risks presented by preventive measures. None
of these principles is a panacea for the dangers of prevention delineated in part I, to be sure,
but robustly enforced, they provide significant safeguards.
23 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–169.
24 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
25 Aaronson, The Terror Factor, supra note 9.
26 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
27 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S 423, 432 (1973), quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,
361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
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B. The Limits of the Legal Constraints
At the same time, each of the doctrinal constraints outlined above is limited in significant
ways, as post-9/11 developments have starkly illustrated. When the demand for prevention
is strong, it will find ways to make itself manifest, and in practice these doctrines may
prove inadequate to guard against abuse. For example, while the First Amendment pro-
hibitions on penalizing speech and association remain intact, Congress has made it a crime
to provide ‘‘material support’’ to disfavored foreign groups, and has defined support
expansively to include speech, such as ‘‘expert advice’’ or ‘‘training,’’ regardless of
whether it advocates or furthers terrorism in any way.28 Hundreds have been prosecuted
under the law, and in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Supreme Court ruled that
this law is constitutional even as applied to speech advocating only human rights and
peace, and neither intended nor likely to further any illegal activity.29 The Court claimed to
be applying heightened scrutiny to the law’s prohibitions on speech, a standard that
generally requires the government to show that penalizing speech is the least restrictive
means to further a compelling state interest. The government did not even argue, much less
demonstrate, that penalizing advocacy of peace and human rights was the least restrictive
means to further the end of fighting terrorism, but the Court nonetheless upheld the law. It
reasoned that given the law’s future-oriented preventive goals, the Court could not require
the government to show that the restrictions were necessary.30 Thus, the law’s preventive
character effectively reduced the level of scrutiny the government had to satisfy in order to
penalize speech because of its content.
In the same case, the Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention, resting on the
Communist Party cases, that penalizing support to a group without proof of intent to further
its illegal ends impermissibly imposed guilt by association in violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments. The Court reasoned that the law did not criminalize membership itself, but
only material support.31 On this reasoning, Congress could have continued to penalize
association with the Communist Party by criminalizing not membership itself, but the
provision of any assistance or support to the group. The right of association is a meaningless
formality if one is not free to do anything to support the group with which one has a right to
associate. What would the right to associate with the Democratic Party or the National Rifle
Association mean, for example, if the government could make it a crime to pay dues to,
speak on behalf of, or volunteer one’s time to the organization? Thus, while it remains true
that the government may not pursue preventive ends by directly penalizing speech or
association, Humanitarian Law Project suggests that it may achieve the same ends by
prohibiting any speech or association in connection with the group as ‘‘material support.’’32
The substantive due process restraints on preventive detention are also less robust than
first appears. While the Court has foreclosed indefinite preventive detention on the basis of
28 18 U.S.C. 2339B.
29 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). I was counsel to Humanitarian Law Project
in this case.
30 For detailed critiques of the Court’s analysis, see David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place
of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 147 (2012);
Owen Fiss, The World We Live In, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 295 (2011).
31 Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2730–31.
32 The First Amendment holding in Humanitarian Law Project may be limited to support to foreign
organizations, as the Ninth Circuit recently implied in a case striking down restrictions on speech provided
as support to a domestic group labeled as terrorist. Al Haramain Islamic Fdn v. U.S. Dept of Treasury, 686
F.3d at 995–1001; Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders, supra note 30.
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mere dangerousness, and has required some showing of mental disability, some have
criticized that process on the ground that it outsources the detention decision to medical
professionals, applying loose and vague standards that courts cannot meaningfully over-
see.33 And because of the skewed incentives in favor of false positives, it is likely that
many persons are civilly committed who would not in fact cause harm if released.
Procedural due process, too, is a less than watertight protection against preventive
abuse. The Supreme Court has long determined what process is due by balancing indi-
vidual interests against government interests, taking into account the risks of error.34 While
the Court has suggested that, at a minimum, procedural due process requires notice and a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the government’s case,35 what that means in practice
is not always crystal-clear. Thus, the Court held that indefinite wartime preventive
detention of a U.S. citizen said to be fighting alongside the enemy could be based on
hearsay, and could be supported by a presumption in favor of the government—effectively
shifting the burden to the detainee to prove his innocence.36 And in the context of asset
freezes and terrorist designations, some courts have ruled that the government may rely on
secret evidence, need only disclose to the designated entity or person any unclassified
evidence it is relying upon (but not the classified evidence), and may limit the opportunity
to respond to a written submission.37
The prohibition on imposing punitive sanctions without criminal trial often begs the
question of what constitutes a punitive sanction. The Court’s application of the multi-factor
test articulated above for identifying punitive sanctions has been anything but consistent.
As Wayne Logan has put it: ‘‘Despite [the subject’s] importance, the Court’s numerous
decisions in the area have amounted to an incoherent muddle. Indeed, one would be hard-
pressed to identify an area of constitutional law that betrays a greater conceptual inco-
herence.’’38 In part, this is because it is not possible to draw a clear line demarcating the
civil from the criminal, and many sanctions that have punitive effects can be defended by
the state as serving some other purpose. In particular, in the preventive context, the state
will almost always claim that its purpose is not to punish but to prevent. If the civil-
criminal divide is going to do any work in setting limits on preventive sanctions, the Court
must be willing to look behind such blanket assertions, as indeed its multi-factor test
invites it to do, by assessing whether the sanction is proportional to the nonpunitive interest
asserted. But given the difficulty of measuring future risk and the effectiveness of pre-
ventive measures, courts will rarely find sanctions disproportionate.
Equal protection doctrine also provides only limited protection, because the Court has
long held that proof of intentional discrimination is required to make out an equal pro-
tection claim under the Constitution. Racial profiling is often difficult to prove, because
officials rarely admit that they rely on racial generalizations, even where the statistical
33 See, e.g., Eric Janus, Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders: The American Experience Versus Inter-
national Human Rights Norms, 31 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 328 (2013).
34 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 219 (1976).
35 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507.
36 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 533–34.
37 Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Other courts have
required more robust process, including notice of the basis for the designation, and where feasible, an
unclassified summary of any classified evidence relied upon, and the provision of access to the classified
evidence to counsel with security clearances. Al Haramain Islamic Found., 686 F.3d at 982–988.
38 Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
1261, 1268 (1998).
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evidence is overwhelming. Statistical showings of disparate impact may in some cir-
cumstances support an inference of intentional discrimination, but unless a court concludes
that intentional discrimination has been proven, no equal protection violation will be
found.39 As a result, few defendants have ever prevailed on a selective prosecution claim.
The entrapment defense also often proves illusory, particularly in cases alleging serious
crimes. The mere fact that a defendant has agreed to commit a criminal offense as serious
as terrorism is generally enough to support an inference that he was predisposed to commit
the offense. Given the profound opprobrium associated with serious crime, a juror is likely
to be very skeptical that anyone not predisposed to engage in such conduct would agree to
commit the crime in question, almost without regard to the nature of the inducement.
While entrapment defenses sometimes succeed in prosecutions for relatively minor crimes,
such as drugs or pornography, they almost never succeed against more serious charges. No
defendant in a terrorism case has successfully mounted an entrapment defense, despite very
aggressive encouragement by informants.40 The defense might be available were the
government to go to truly extraordinary lengths in encouraging a reluctant individual to
undertake a relatively modest terrorist crime, such as the provision of otherwise innocuous
material support. But for the most part, the cases since 9/11 in which the government has
prosecuted individuals for terrorist crimes that they were encouraged to undertake involve
the provision of military-type support, such as missiles, or actual attempted terrorist acts,
such as attempting to detonate a bomb.
Other preventive measures confront no constitutional or legal barriers at all. Thus, the
Constitution imposes no obstacle to the common preventive practice of pretextual prose-
cution, in which the government identifies an individual suspected of engaging in or
planning to engage in serious crime, for which it lacks sufficient evidence to convict, and
prosecutes him instead for some other relatively minor offense in order to ‘‘disrupt’’ the
more serious crime. U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft proudly announced that this
tactic would be used after 9/11, and thousands of persons ‘‘of interest’’ to the 9/11
investigation were rounded up, mostly on immigration charges, and eventually deported, in
an effort to prevent a follow-on attack. (None of over 5,000 foreign nationals detained in
the first two years after 9/11 in anti-terrorism initiatives was ultimately convicted of a
terrorist offense, though many were deported for minor immigration infractions.)
Pretextual stops, a less intrusive but far more common preventive law enforcement
practice, also face few constitutional obstacles. In Whren v. United States,41 the Supreme
Court upheld the practice of pretextual traffic stops—in which police officers stop drivers
for traffic infractions in hopes of discovering some other crime, usually drug possession or
trafficking. The traffic laws are so extensive that it is said the police can stop virtually
anyone in an automobile simply by following them for ten minutes. It is no coincidence
that so many accounts of ‘‘racial profiling’’ involve traffic stops. As the post-9/11 roundups
demonstrated, immigration law provides a similarly rich opportunity for pretextual arrests
of foreign nationals, because its regulations and requirements are so byzantine and
extensive.42
Recent controversies over aggressive ‘‘stop-and-frisk’’ practices in New York City,
disproportionately targeted at black and Hispanic young men, illustrate that pedestrians can
39 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279.
40 See Aaronson, The Terror Factory, supra note 9.
41 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
42 See David Cole, Driving While Immigrant, The Nation, May 12, 2003.
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also be subjected to pretextual preventive coercive measures without much constitutional
constraint. The Supreme Court has ruled that a temporary stop is permissible only where
the police have ‘‘reasonable suspicion,’’ based on objective facts, that crime is afoot, and
that a frisk or pat-down of the outer clothing is permissible only where the police also have
‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ that the individual is armed.43 However, the vast majority of such
encounters do not lead to a criminal prosecution, and as a result, trigger no court super-
vision. In New York City, for example, in 2011, only two percent of stops and frisks found
contraband of any kind.44 It is generally not worth it for any one individual to sue civilly
for such an encounter, as the damages are likely to be minimal even if the plaintiff
establishes liability. Recent class action lawsuits in New York and Philadelphia have
underscored the extent to which such stops and frisks are often conducted without the
constitutionally required reasonable suspicion, but it remains to be seen whether effective
remedies will be developed.
Thus, while the Constitution and entrapment law impose some important outer
boundaries on coercive preventive measures, the government retains substantial discretion
within those boundaries to engage in preventive coercion. Constitutional doctrine fore-
closes the most extreme preventive measures—detention for dangerousness alone, crimi-
nalization of speech and association, punishment without trial, explicit racial profiling, and
truly outrageous efforts at entrapment. But the government can avoid those extremes and
still engage in a broad range of targeted, coercive preventive measures, most of which still
implicate the normative concerns identified in Part I above. At the end of the day, the most
significant checks on prevention are likely to be more political than legal. This is not to say
that the constitutional constraints detailed above are unimportant, but only that most of the
‘‘action’’ occurs within the outer boundaries of those formal constraints.
III. Informal Checks
If constitutional and other formal legal checks play only a limited role in the actual give
and take of preventive measures, are there alternative sources of constraint? What are they,
and how are they triggered? What can be done to ensure that preventive coercive measures
avoid the normative concerns identified above?
A. Community Response and Legitimacy
Perhaps the most important source of limitation on preventive justice as it is practiced
today is community reaction. One of the most valuable tools in preventing crime is good
community relations. If the community trusts the police, its members are more likely to
cooperate in investigations by offering testimony or leads. No one is more likely to know
where trouble lies than those living in the relevant community. Their ‘‘eyes and ears’’ are
critical to effective ferreting out of potential criminals before they commit their worst
crimes, as well as to bringing perpetrators to justice for past crimes.
Community trust may affect the level of crime even more directly. Studies show that
one of the most influential forces determining whether people obey the law is its perceived
43 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
44 Center for Constitutional Rights, 2011 NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Statistics, available at http://ccrjustice.org/
files/CCR-Stop-and-Frisk-Fact-Sheet-2011.pdf.
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legitimacy.45 If the community views coercive preventive measures targeted at their
members as unfair or unjust, they may ultimately prove self-defeating.
The police know this. Federal and local law enforcement officials after 9/11, for
example, initiated a series of ‘‘councils’’ with members of the Arab and Muslim com-
munities in several cities, including Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles. Through regular
meetings with community leaders, they sought to foster trust and open lines of commu-
nication, in large part so that if community members identified a potential terrorist in their
midst, they would be inclined to contact law enforcement officials in time to prevent a
terrorist act. This effort was also likely designed to offset the resentment that might be
triggered when many preventive law enforcement measures were targeted at Arab and
Muslim communities. Even though that targeting might not be vulnerable to a successful
equal protection challenge, for the reasons discussed above, law enforcement officials were
nonetheless sensitive to the appearance of unfairness that it was likely to generate, and
sought to assuage those concerns by working with and listening to community leaders.
Similarly, police initiatives designed to prevent gun violence and close open-air drug
markets often include as an essential element the involvement of the community. In his
recent book, Don’t Shoot, David Kennedy advocates that police seeking to reduce gun
violence in the inner city, for example, engage the community in order both to help
identify the small number of individuals who are responsible for most of the violence, and
to offer assistance to those who agree to change course and forswear violence for more
law-abiding ways.46 The initiatives, which require the affirmative involvement of the
community, appear to have been successful in multiple cities, coinciding with dramatic
drops in gun violence.
The constitutional and normative concerns delineated above play an important role here,
even if they do not often lead to formal judicial checks. Perceptions of legitimacy are
shaped by normative constitutional concerns. The question for the state therefore is not
simply whether preventive measures can withstand a lawsuit, but whether the commu-
nity will view them as legitimate. The police need legitimacy, and legitimacy demands
fidelity to the spirit of constitutional concerns, not just the avoidance of courtroom defeats.
If the state implements overly aggressive preventive measures that appear to be
sweeping up the innocent, running roughshod over procedural safeguards, imposing undue
burdens on community members, or unfairly treating one group of persons differently than
others, the measures may well jeopardize prevention by undermining community relations
and the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement. In this sense, there ought to be a self-
correcting mechanism; as police see the alienating and counterproductive effects of their
more problematic preventive initiatives, they should have an incentive to roll them back. In
New York City, for example, the police, perhaps in response to a slew of negative publicity
about the ‘‘stop-and-frisk’’ program, dramatically reduced the number of people subjected
to the practice—even before a court ruled their practices unconstitutional.47
However, this corrective mechanism is not automatic; in fact, it is unlikely to work well
at all without significant effort. There are too many barriers to information; both sides of
45 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Z. Huq,
Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 Law &
Soc. Rev. 365 (2010).
46 David M. Kennedy, Don’t Shoot: One Man, a Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in Inner-City
America (2012). For a more detailed analysis of Kennedy’s project, see David Cole, Our Romance With
Guns, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Sept. 27, 2012.
47 Tamer El-Ghobashy and Michael Howard Saul, New York Police Use of Stop-and-Frisk Drops, Wall St.
J., May 6, 2013.
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the relationship may labor under preconceptions and distrust that interfere with effective
communication. The police may not know the community well; community members may
lack the wherewithal to express their views effectively. At one workshop I attended on
police-citizen councils in Muslim communities, an FBI agent opened his remarks with a
revealing slip of the tongue: ‘‘When we go out to meet the enemy… I mean, the com-
munity…’’ Therein lies the problem; even the most sensitive law enforcement officer may
find it difficult to separate his suspicions of the community from his suspicions of trou-
blemakers that he fears may lie within the community but has been unable to identify.
When the state acts preventively, this confusion is especially likely, because law
enforcement officials don’t know who or where the future troublemakers actually are.
How can the divide between the community and the police be bridged? Citizen-police
councils are a good start. If they are undertaken in good faith, they may help demystify the
community for the police, and vice versa. Constructive police-community partnerships of
the type David Kennedy has advocated may also build trust. Better education of the police
about the costs of illegitimate policing might increase police sensitivity to that concern.
Similarly, better information sharing by the police to explain to the community what they
are doing and why may help build trust. Community-based nongovernmental organizations
may enable members of the community to express their concerns to the police more
effectively.
But the problem is not just one of communication; it is also often one of practice. If the
police are employing preventive coercive measures that sweep too broadly, or that appear
to discriminate against particular communities, or that fail to treat community members
with dignity and respect, the legitimacy of their efforts will be undermined. In this sense,
effectiveness of prevention is linked inextricably to the normative justice of the preventive
measures. A preventive measure that ‘‘works’’ in disrupting crime but is widely viewed in
the community as unfair, unduly harsh, or discriminatory, will have significant counter-
productive consequences that will compromise its preventive effectiveness.
Rights concerns are often identified as being in tension with law enforcement interests.
The Fourth Amendment, for example, is typically described as balancing protections of
privacy against interests in effective law enforcement. There are, to be sure, difficult
tradeoffs to be made. But what is often lost in the language of tradeoffs is the extent to
which rights concerns and security are mutually reinforcing. If preventive measures are
carried out in ways that are consistent with rights concerns, they will gain legitimacy,
which in turn will foster both law-abiding and law-enforcement-assisting behavior on the
part of the citizenry.
B. Resource Constraints
Resource constraints are another informal limitation on coercive preventive measures. Law
enforcement is always costly, but when it is employed to bring criminals to justice, there
are measurable outcomes; a proven criminal is or is not held accountable for specific past
acts. The effects of preventive measures are, by contrast, nearly always speculative. One
can rarely know what might have happened if the preventive measures were not adopted.
The mark of a successful preventive measure is that nothing happens. The mark of an
unnecessary and wasteful preventive measure is the same. The United States has not had
another major terrorist attack on its soil in the twelve years since 9/11, but it is impossible
to say which of the many preventive initiatives undertaken in the interim can take credit for
that fact.
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Prevention is expensive. Because we cannot predict where the next threat might arise, or
what form it might take, preventive initiatives tend to sweep much more broadly than
investigations of specific past or ongoing crimes designed to bring specific perpetrators to
justice. As noted above, the United States is spending roughly $20 million per suspected
terrorist per year on preventive counterterrorism measures. At some point, that kind of
expenditure is just unsustainable.48
Scarcity may become less of a constraint, however, as technological advances in
computing make it cheaper to engage in mass surveillance. The fact that most of what we
do these days leaves a digital trace, and that computers can easily access, collect, and mine
that data in ways that were simply not possible before the digital age means that police are
more likely to be tempted to employ dragnet measures. In the old days, the cost of dragnet
surveillance was probably as much of a deterrent as constitutional doctrine. Today, as
Edward Snowlden’s revelations about NSA spying illustrate, the costs of dragnet sur-
veillance have become much less significant, making the adoption of legal rules and
strong norms all the more important.
C. Accountability Mechanisms
Accountability mechanisms might also help keep prevention in check. Too often, pre-
ventive measures are undertaken in secret, and little effort is made to account for their
success or failure. When an investigation culminates in a criminal prosecution for a foiled
terrorist act, of course, we see the results of preventive policing quite vividly. But that is
the exception to the rule. When, for example, the New York Police Department engages in
widespread stop-and-frisk practices, the FBI recruits informants and sends undercover
agents into Muslim communities, immigration authorities call in foreign nationals from
Arab and Muslim countries for ‘‘special registration,’’ the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) places individuals on no-fly or secondary screening lists, the
Treasury Department designates a suspected supporter of terrorism and freezes his assets,
or the NSA collects detailed ‘‘metadata’’ on every American’s phone use, the public often
knows little or nothing about the cost and/or effectiveness of these programs. Most can and
are undertaken without having to justify the action to a court, and many are undertaken on
the basis of classified evidence. Little if any reporting, even in the aggregate, is done on the
effectiveness of these measures.
More transparent reporting on such measures may create pressures to keep them in
check. If the public knew, for example, how much ‘‘special registration’’ cost and whether
any of the approximately 83,000 foreign nationals subject to ‘‘special registration’’ were
ultimately convicted of a terrorist crime, that information might guide assessments of
whether the program was worth it. If the TSA reported on the number of people subject to
secondary screenings and the number of times secondary screenings revealed someone
carrying a prohibited item on an airplane, that data might inform judgments about the
accuracy and effectiveness of that program. The police generally do not publish the out-
comes of stop-and-frisk practices, but data disclosed in connection with a class action
lawsuit in New York City has revealed that over 700,000 persons were stopped in 2011
48 William Stuntz and Dan Richman have argued that, for this reason, pretextual prosecutions are much less
likely to be undertaken by state than federal prosecutors. Daniel Richman and William Stuntz, Al Capone’s
Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Policing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2005). State
and local police generally have limited resources and a specific jurisdiction, and must dedicate most of their
limited resources to responding to serious crimes and bringing the perpetrators of such crimes to justice—for
those crimes—within that jurisdiction. Id. at 600–605.
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alone, and that the tactic rarely resulted in the discovery of contraband or weapons. These
facts, and the public debate they fostered, may already have led to a paring back of the
program, according to the most recent statistics.49 What have been the results of the
Treasury Department’s asset-freezing program in terms of terror funds halted, and at what
cost? What terrorist plots has the NSA’s telephone metadata program helped to foil?50
What is the basis for the government’s assertions that those it has targeted are in fact
involved in terrorism? Again, if this information were made public, the public would be
better equipped to assess whether these costly programs are worth it.
As noted above, one cannot ultimately measure in any precise way the effects of many
preventive measures, because if nothing happens, one generally cannot know whether that
was because nothing would have happened anyway, or because a preventive program
deterred or prevented something bad from happening. But some assessments can be made.
If, as Jules Lobel and I have shown, not one of the over 5,000 foreign nationals preven-
tively detained in counter-terrorism initiatives after 9/11, not one of the 8,000 young men
from Arab and Muslim countries whom the FBI sought out for interviews after 9/11, and
not one of the 83,000 persons called in for ‘‘special registration’’ by immigration
authorities after 9/11 was ultimately convicted of a terrorist offense, it suggests that the net
was cast too widely, and that a more targeted approach might have proved more effec-
tive—and less likely to generate resentment among Muslim communities.51 But these
statistics are rarely if ever reported by the government. Watchdog groups and scholars do
the best they can to fill the gaps, but the extent to which the programs and their imple-
mentation are classified make such assessments difficult. Requiring more robust and
transparent reporting as a matter of law would be far preferable.
Without adequate accountability mechanisms, there are few incentives to cut back on
preventive initiatives. Because assessments are often speculative, initiatives are often
secret, and at its core the extent to which prevention works is often unknowable, those
selling such programs are rarely challenged. Meanwhile, decision-makers fear being
blamed after the fact for not taking every possible precaution. Fear drives spending, and
promises of prevention are easy to make and difficult to disprove.
D. Breadth
The final informal or political check on preventive measures is a decidedly mixed blessing.
The more sweeping a preventive measure is, the more likely it is that political checks will
ensure that it respects citizens’ rights. By contrast, the political process is unlikely to
constrain more narrowly targeted preventive programs. As noted above, because of the
difficulty of predicting the future, preventive initiatives often tend to sweep broadly. If they
sweep broadly enough, they will implicate enough people’s interests that the democratic
process will register those concerns. Thus, security procedures at airports have been
repeatedly revised and streamlined in response to objections about unfairness, undue
burdens, and the like. These procedures apply to everyone, so we all have an interest in
49 El-Ghobashy and Saul, supra note 47; Center for Constitutional Rights, 2011 NYPD Stop-and-Frisk
Statistics, supra note 44.
50 The NSA has been able to identify only one or perhaps two such cases. See Shaun Waterman, NSA
chief’s admission of misleading numbers adds to Obama administration blunders, Wash. Times, Oct. 2,
2013, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/2/nsa-chief-figures-foiled-terror-plots-
misleading/?page=all.
51 See David Cole and Jules Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free: Why America Is Losing the War on Terror
107–109 (2008).
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ensuring that they are minimally invasive. That concern, for example, caused the TSA to
adapt its screening technology recently to avoid the revealing images that its imaging
machines initially created. Public outcry was sufficient to force a change.
Similarly, the few security proposals that generated legislative opposition in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 were those that implicated everyone’s rights—the suggestion
that the United States introduce a national identity card; the Terrorism Information Pre-
vention System program, which was designed to recruit delivery employees and others to
spy on homeowners and report suspicious activity; and the Total Information Awareness
datamining program, in which the military proposed to mine all the electronic data
available about all of us for patterns of terrorist activity. Each of these programs implicated
everyone’s rights, and sparked immediate opposition, leading Congress to prohibit any
expenditure on them.52 Reactions to the NSA’s phone data program in the summer and fall
of 2013 reinforce the point. This program touches the rights of every American who uses a
phone, and has consequently generated substantial protest.
By contrast, more targeted measures that do not implicate the rights of a broad swath of
the public often generate little public opposition. American citizens and media expressed
far more concern over the military detention of two U.S. citizens than over the detention of
hundreds of foreign nationals in Afghanistan and in secret prisons around the globe.
Americans showed much greater concern about the use of a drone to kill an American than
their use to kill thousands of foreign nationals. And the NSA program focused on
Americans has prompted far greater protest at home than the programs targeted at foreign
nationals. As long as security measures could be defended on the ground that the gov-
ernment was sacrificing the rights of aliens, not citizens, they generated little opposition
from Congress or the general public.53
This has both beneficial and pernicious effects. It creates a built-in brake on prevention,
because the government knows its actions will be more difficult to sustain politically the
more widely they apply. But it also encourages double standards that treat ‘‘them’’ dif-
ferently from ‘‘us.’’ And as long as the government adopts narrowly targeted prevention
mechanisms that it can assure the general public it need not worry about applying to
themselves, the majoritarian political process is unlikely to pose any real roadblocks.
IV. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of preventive motives in ordinary criminal law enforcement,
preventive coercion imposed without a specific criminal act poses distinct normative
concerns. When the state acts on the basis of predictions, it must necessarily reduce the
degree of certainty it demands before imposing coercion, because there is an inherent
uncertainty about the future. To the extent that it restricts an individual’s liberty based on
fear of what she might do in the future, it disrespects her free will to choose to conform her
actions to the law. The need to base predictions on generalizations makes selective
enforcement a particular risk, as racial and ethnic profiling demonstrate. The absence of
good metrics for prevention’s success undermines the effectiveness of feedback data to
check government excesses. And the inherent difference between visible false negatives
and invisible false positives skews decision-making. These concerns should make us
52 David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism
72–74 (2004).
53 Id.
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skeptical about preventive coercion. It unquestionably has a place in law enforcement, but
its place must be carefully circumscribed.
In U.S. law, formal legal checks do impose some outer bounds on how far the state may
go in depriving individuals of their liberty or property on preventive grounds. In theory,
rights of free speech, free association, substantive and procedural due process, equal
protection, limits on entrapment, and the right not to be penalized without a criminal trial
constrain preventive measures. However, each of these constraints is itself limited in
practice for various reasons, especially in times of fear where demands for prevention are
at their highest.
The absence of robust legal constraints does not mean, however, that the government is
entirely free, within the bounds of what courts will enforce, to impose preventive coercive
measures. A number of informal, practical, and ‘‘soft law’’ constraints may in fact do much
of the day-to-day work in confining the scope of preventive justice. If preventive measures
are perceived as illegitimate, because they depart from the spirit of the constitutional and
normative principles identified above, they will be less effective. Thus, police will have
incentives to rein in their programs when they see the deleterious effects they are having.
Preventive measures are costly, and resource limitations may play a moderating role in
preventive justice as applied. Accountability mechanisms, rendering preventive initiatives
and their results more transparent, may also promote a more modest preventive paradigm.
And finally, to the extent that preventive measures sweep broadly, they are more likely to
generate widespread democratic opposition.
In the end, then, it is critically important to recognize that preventive justice poses
distinctive concerns. At the same time, in part because prevention is a legitimate goal and
tactic in many settings, the formal legal limits on prevention are relatively modest, prin-
cipally policing only the outer bounds of prevention. Most of the checks on preventive
justice are likely to be the result of less formal, soft law concerns. And this means that we,
as citizens, are ultimately the ones responsible for preventing the worst of prevention.
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